# REPORT BY THE CHANNEL TUNNEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON SAFETY IN THE CHANNEL TUNNEL FIXED LINK DURING 2012

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### A - Scope of the report

1. This report contains information relating to the activities of the Channel Tunnel Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) in its role as the safety authority for the Channel Fixed Link (the Channel Tunnel) within the terms of the European Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC). The IGC's responsibilities extend only to the area of the Fixed Link as described in the Treaty of Canterbury between the United Kingdom and France and the Concession Agreement between the two Governments and the Concessionaires. This report covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2012.

2. As this report was written in English the optional summary in that language has not been prepared. A French translation has been prepared and submitted to ERA together with the English document as it is the policy of the IGC to make all of its documents which are in the public domain available in both English and French. Readers of the French version who wish to consult the optional summary in English are invited to refer to the full English version which includes a summary.

### **B** - Introductory Section

3. **Introduction** - The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC as amended) makes provision for a binational body entrusted by Member States to ensure a unified safety regime for specialised cross-border infrastructures to take on the tasks of "national safety authority" (NSA). This provision has been applied in respect of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link and the United Kingdom and France have agreed that the IGC should be the "national safety authority". This report is prepared in accordance with Article 18 of the Directive and, so far as possible, conforms to the template and guidance issued by the European Railway Agency (ERA) with a view to providing a common structure and content for such reports. It is submitted to ERA as required by the Directive but its intended audience is anybody with an interest in the safety of the Fixed Link or similar infrastructures.

4. **Railway Structure Information** - The railway infrastructure of the Channel Tunnel comprises the twin bore tunnel rail link under the English Channel between Cheriton in Kent and Fréthun in the Pas-de-Calais, together with the terminal areas on either side. The terminal areas include the high speed lines linking the tunnel with the UK and French national networks; the loops and the platforms used for the loading and unloading of the tourist and shuttle trains carrying lorries; and the yards and maintenance facilities and their associated links to the rest of the infrastructure.

5. **Infrastructure Manager** - A network map and information about Eurotunnel, the infrastructure manager for the Channel Tunnel, is at **Annex A**.

6. **Railway Undertakings** - The railway undertakings which operated trains through the Channel Tunnel during the period covered by this report were English Welsh & Scottish International Limited (EWSI), DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd, Eurostar International Ltd and Europorte Channel. The address and websites for these companies is at Annex A.3. More detailed information about them appears in the annual reports of the French and UK safety authorities as appropriate.

- 7. Summary Key safety events in 2012 were as follow:
  - electrocution of a Eurotunnel contractor on 3 July 2012, the first workforce fatality to occur on the Concession since the start of operations;
  - explosion in a Eurotunnel locomotive on 21 July 2012.
  - fire on a car transporter on board a shuttle carrying heavy goods vehicles on 29 November 2012;
  - the continuation of a review of the national safety and technical rules relating to rolling stock transiting the tunnel, summarised in IGC's published letter to Eurotunnel of 21 September 2012<sup>1</sup>;
  - consultation on the revision of the binational safety regulation for the tunnel, to transpose Directive 2008/57, and the revised Directive 2004/49<sup>2</sup>; and

http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/spip.php?action=acceder\_document&arg=228&cle=b90c43abd0abe1af10135bc 515eb4eae&file=pdf%2FReview\_of\_safety\_rules-4.pdf

- discussions with potential operators of new services about authorisation for placing vehicles into service, and Part B certification<sup>3</sup>.
- •

8. **General Trend Analysis** - The IGC and the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA) continued to monitor Eurotunnel's safety management arrangements and safety performance. Many of the Common Safety Indicators (CSIs) reported on in detail at Annex C remain at zero. Eurotunnel was able to meet its target frequency rate for individual safety events (Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs), loss of points' detection, binding brakes' detection, non-respect of cab signalling, fuel spillages and crossover door incidents) which was reduced from 400 to 300 during the year. However, the incidence of collective safety events (emergency braking due to wheelslip or automatic activation and stoppages in the tunnel for more than 30 minutes), though lower than in previous years, was higher than the set objective (76 instead of 65). Also, lost time accident rates increased from 2011 levels, in respect of both Eurotunnel staff and contractors.

<sup>2</sup> The revised bi-national regulation subsequently came into force in March 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Following this consideration, an amended Part B certificate to include high-speed passenger operations was issued to DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd. on 14 June 2013.

### <u>C - Organisation</u>

9. The IGC was established by the Treaty of Canterbury to supervise, in the name and on behalf of the Governments of the UK and the French Republic, all matters concerning the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel. The functions of the IGC include drawing up, or participating in the preparation of, regulations applicable to the Channel Tunnel.

10. The Treaty of Canterbury also established the CTSA to advise and assist the IGC on all matters concerning safety in the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel. The functions of the CTSA also include ensuring that the safety measures and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with the national and international laws in force; enforcing such laws and monitoring their implementation; and examining reports concerning incidents affecting safety, making investigations and reporting to the IGC.

11. UK and French Secretariats arrange for the preparation and execution of the IGC and the CTSA's decisions.

12. A chart showing the structure of the IGC and its relationships with other bodies is at Annex B.

### **D** - The Development of Railway Safety

### D1 – Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performance

Accidents/precursors which triggered the measure			Safety measure decided
Date	Place	Description of the event	
03/07/2012	French Terminal catenary isolation area	Electrocution of sub- contractor working at height; burns and major electric shock to second worker; and electric shock to third worker on control box	Eurotunnel reminder of the rules to be followed when using mobile elevating work platforms on platforms and in maintenance areas was issued.
21/07/2012	Technical compartment of locomotive stabled at French Terminal	Blast wave lifted the locomotive roof, which fell back down on the side of the machine.	Installation of temperature sensors on the air compressor.

### Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents/precursors to these

### Table D.1.2 - Safety measures with other triggers

Safety measure decided	Description of the trigger of the measures	Safety measure decided
N/A		

### D 2 – Detailed Data Trend Analysis

14. The Channel Tunnel unfortunately suffered its first worker fatality in 2012, along with two cases of injury in the same incident. There was also an explosion in a locomotive and a fire originating from a vehicle on a train in motion. There were very few recorded precursors (incidents which could have led to an accident): nine broken rails, six SPADs and one axle lock due to a wheel flat on a Eurotunnel shuttle carrying heavy goods vehicles. A detailed trend analysis related to the CSIs would not therefore be meaningful. An overview of the occurrence of precursor CSIs is below.

2011	2012

Total number of precursors	15	16
Total number of broken rails	8	9
Total number of track buckles	0	0
Total number of wrong-side signalling failures	0	0
Total number of signals passed at danger	6	6
Total number of broken wheels on rolling stock in service	0	0
Total number of broken axles on rolling stock in service	1	1

15. **Common Safety Indicators (CSIs)** – Detailed data relating to the CSIs as defined in the Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) can be found at Annex C.

### D 3 – Results of Safety Recommendations

17. During 2012, the IGC continued to monitor Eurotunnel's response to the fire that occurred onboard an HGV shuttle train travelling from the UK to France on 11 September 2008. All recommendations arising from the incident have now been closed out.

18. Although the fire led to no deaths and only relatively minor injuries, it was recognised that this was a serious accident that required full investigation. A formal investigation into the fire was therefore launched by the French Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre (BEA-TT) assisted by the UK Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). The report was received on 16 November 2010.

19. As required by Article 25(3) of the Safety Directive, the IGC responded to BEA-TT on the anniversary of its report in 2012. That response can be found here:

http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/Fire-of-11-September-2008.html?lang=en

and explains that all 39 recommendations had been closed out.

### E - Important Changes in Legislation and Regulation

17. **The Regulation of Safety of the Channel Fixed Link** – During the period covered by this report the IGC continued to progress the transposition of the amended Railway Safety Directive (2008/110/EC) and the new Interoperability Directive (2008/57/EC) for the Fixed Link. A public consultation on the revised regulation took place in 2012, and the regulation was subsequently adopted in February 2013.

18. **Other Significant Regulatory Issues Considered by the IGC and CTSA** - Other important issues considered by the IGC and the CTSA during the course of the year were as follows:

**Review of specific safety rules for trains transiting the tunnel** – The IGC continued to progress its review of the specific safety and technical rules for the Channel Tunnel, started in 2009 and supported by ERA's technical opinion published in March 2011. The IGC has already repealed some rules which were deemed useless or no longer relevant following the bringing into force of the TSI. The IGC therefore obtained independent advice from Egis Rail on the impact of removing the 30-minute running requirement from passenger trains transiting the Tunnel. Egis Rail's study concluded that the benefits of retaining the rule that passenger trains on fire in the Tunnel must be able to continue running for 30 minutes, so as to be able to exit the tunnel, outweighed the costs.

In October 2012 the IGC therefore asked the French and UK member states to submit specific cases under the TSI retaining the requirement for trains using the Channel Tunnel to be capable of running for 30 minutes while on fire. ERA's revision of the Safety in Railway Tunnels (SRT) and the Locomotive & Passenger Rolling Stock (LOC&PAS) Technical Specification of Interoperability (TSIs) continued into 2013, including consideration of the UK and French requests for specific cases.

The other Tunnel-specific requirements considered in IGC's review and consultation were formally removed by IGC's letter to Eurotunnel of 21 September 2012, which can be found at:

http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/Unified-safety-rulesconsultation.html?lang=en

- (i) Discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers During the course of the year the IGC and the CTSA engaged in discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers about the requirements upon them to obtain technical authorisation and Part B certification for operation through the tunnel. This detailed consideration prepared the way for Part B certification to be issued to a new passenger operator in 2013.
- (ii) Participation in the work of the European Railway Agency and its working groups – The IGC and the CTSA continued to play a full part in the work of the European Railway Agency (ERA) and its various working groups. Given their limited resources it has been necessary for the IGC and the CTSA to participate directly in those activities which were of the greatest interest and, for other activities, to rely on liaison with, and feedback from, experts from the UK and French safety authorities. Nevertheless, the IGC and CTSA continued to play an active part in meetings of the ERA Network of National Safety Authorities and in working groups and workshops dealing with common safety methods for monitoring and supervision, SRT TSI revision, and cross-acceptance. On behalf of the IGC, the heads of UK and French delegations to CTSA met ERA on several occasions in 2012 to discuss the 30 minute running capability requirement for passenger trains. In addition, the IGC and the CTSA continued to give careful consideration to all questionnaires and surveys received from the ERA and made substantive responses wherever it was considered that IGC could add expertise and value to the agency's investigations.

### F - The Development of Safety Certification and Authorisation

### 1. National legislation - starting dates - availability

19. The Railway Safety Directive was transposed for the Channel Tunnel by a binational regulation dated 24 January 2007, and came into force on 4 July 2008 through Statutory Instrument 2007-3531 in the UK and Décret 2008-748 in France. The binational regulation was amended in 2013 (see paragraph 17) and the updated guidelines on the application of the regulation can be found on the IGC website at the following page:

http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/Regulations-and-guidance,25.html?lang=en.

20. Part A certificates for Eurostar International (for passenger operations), DB Schenker and EWSI (for freight operations) expired in 2012 and thus prompted applications from all three companies for renewal of the associated Part B certificates for the Channel Tunnel. The IGC dealt with each of these applications within the timescales set out in the legislation. Numerical data on certification and procedure can be found at Annex E.

### **G** - Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

22. The 1986 Treaty of Canterbury places responsibility on the CTSA to ensure that the safety measures and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with the national or international laws in force, to enforce such laws, to monitor their implementation and to report to the Intergovernmental Commission. It also states that for the purpose of carrying out its functions, the Safety Authority may invoke the assistance of the authorities of each Government or any body or expert of its choice and that the two Governments shall grant to the Safety Authority and its members and agents such powers of investigation, inspection and direction as are necessary for the performance of its functions. The Concession Agreement states that the Concessionaires shall afford access to all parts of the Fixed Link to persons duly authorised by the IGC or, under its supervision, by the CTSA, for the purposes of any of their functions, to inspect the Fixed Link and to investigate any matter relating to its construction or operation and shall afford such persons the facilities necessary for the performance of these functions.

23. The broad remit given to the CTSA by the Treaty of Canterbury means that it is responsible for supervising a number of topics outside the framework of NSA tasks prescribed in the Safety Directive, in particular issues around rescue and public safety. This is reflected in our supervision activity. During 2012, it was decided that specialised working groups in charge of monitoring health and civil engineering /fixed equipment would be suppressed in order to enable the delegations to take on more expertise on interoperability issues. It will be possible to create ad hoc groups if necessary.

### 1.1 Audits/Inspections/Checklists

23. The current five-year (2009-14) inspection and audit programme has been drawn up to take account of the key elements included in Eurotunnel's Safety Management System (SMS). The programme covers inspections and audits during the lifespan of the SMS, to ensure that the IGC is able to fulfil its supervision function, and is prepared for its consideration of an application for renewed safety authorisation in 2014.

24. The following supervision methods were used during 2012:

- inspections of both Eurotunnel and railway undertakings (a list of topics covered is below);
- industry reporting regular reports from Eurotunnel such as the daily Operations Duty Manager report; monthly summaries of safety events; Safety Committee Minutes; Operating Performance reports;
- information gained from the investigation of accidents and incidents;
- audit reports (both internal and external);
- ad-hoc meetings between Eurotunnel and Safety Authority experts;
- meetings with railway undertakings;
- information from Eurotunnel concerning interfaces with railway undertakings.

### 1.2 Vigilance aspects/sensitive points to follow-up by the NSA

26. Inspections over the course of the year gave rise to 7 recommendations which were formally communicated to Eurotunnel (and where appropriate to the railway undertakings) by the CTSA. These included:

- adopting a practice to terminate all wires that could have an effect upon the safe operation of the railway;
- that train crew guidance which covers various evacuation procedures should be amended to include the procedures for a range of Explosive Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN(E)) incidents; and
- replacement of the existing self-breather apparatus on shuttles carrying passenger cars with equipment affording the same or improved level of protection to the wearer.

27. All recommendations were added to a consolidated log of recommendations to enable the CTSA to monitor and review with Eurotunnel its progress in taking suitable action in response to them.

2. Description of the coverage of the legal aspects within the annual reports from the railway undertakings and the infrastructure managers – availability of the annual reports before 30 June [according to Article 9(4) of the Railway Safety Directive]

28. The infrastructure manager and railway undertakings reported on their activities in accordance with the requirements of Article 9(4) and Annex I of the Railway Safety Directive. Though EWSI, DB Schenker and Europorte Channel's reports were received after 30 June, the late submission did not prevent the information being taken into account by IGC in the preparation of this report.

### 3. Inspections

29. Planned inspection activity continued to be based on areas identified by the CTSA's experts during their analysis of the Eurotunnel's SMS. However, inspection plans retained sufficient flexibility to respond to areas which emerged from Eurotunnel's activities during the course of the year.

30. In total, seven inspections were undertaken by CTSA experts on the following topics:

- the condition of the generators on the French terminal;

- the equipment at the above-ground crossover at the UK end of the Channel Tunnel;

- the infrastructure manager's telecommunications systems;

- the infrastructure manager's preparedness for a CBRN(E) incident, at each of its terminals (two inspections);

- the infrastructure manager's responses to previous inspection recommendations relating to civil engineering; and

- the roles and responsibilities of Eurotunnel's Agents de Feu.

31. The CTSA also continued to supervise Eurotunnel's implementation and monitoring of four new fire-fighting stations in the Channel Tunnel. In particular the CTSA sought assurances regarding:

- the catenary auto-earthing design and equipment specifications;

- new procedures for emergency responders, such as how emergencies are communciated; and
- the introduction of a manual catenary earthing switch, and related procedures.

32. Finally, the CTSA worked with Eurotunnel to monitor the change of provider of emergency response contractor that took place on 31 December 2012. In order to do this, Eurotunnel was asked for the details of the training plan for new response staff, and confirmation that the new contractor would perform the actions required of it with regard to safety and security management. Supervision of this change continued into 2013.

### 4. Audits

33. During 2012, Eurotunnel undertook 28 internal audits while the four railway undertakings undertook 10 internal audits in total on such topics as incident reporting and document management, and change management.

34. Eurotunnel also participated in audits undertaken by DB Schenker and Europorte Channel to understand the railway undertakings' procedures at depots and for the carriage of dangerous goods respectively.

35. On behalf of the IGC, the French NSA, EPSF, undertook an audit of the implementation and effectiveness of the system set up by Eurotunnel to generate and manage safety documentation.

5. Summary of the relevant corrective measures/actions (amendment, revocation, suspension, important warning, etc.) related to safety aspects following these audits/inspections

36. Overall the inspection programme for 2012 and other monitoring and supervision activities undertaken during the course of the year provided sufficient evidence to conclude that, while there was a continuing need for vigilance, the operation of the Fixed Link continued to be acceptably safe – no corrective measures were implemented.

## H. Reporting on the application of the Common Safety Method (CSM) on risk evaluation and assessment

37. As part of its application for a Part B certificate for operation of passenger trains through the Channel Tunnel, DB Schenker was asked to undertake a risk evaluation in accordance with the CSM, of evacuating two units of 200m in length, rather than the existing configuration of trains used (one unit of 400m length). The IGC was able to use DB Schenker's evaluation, and the report produced by the Rail Safety and Standards Board as independent safety assessor, when making its decision about DB's application for certification, consideration of which continued into 2013.

38. During 2012, Eurotunnel removed the original protective coverings from one type of their shuttles used to carry heavy goods vehicles. In accordance with the CSM, Eurotunnel compiled a risk assessment of the change to wagons, and asked Certifer to produce an independent safety assessment. Certifer's report was taken into account by the IGC in its role as the NSA when deciding to authorise the placing into service of the modified vehicles in July 2012.

### I - IGC Conclusions on Year 2012 – Priorities

39. The Channel Tunnel railway is of immense importance, carrying over twenty million road and rail passengers between Britain and France each year and connecting Britain to the high speed rail network of the European mainland. As a 50 kilometre long undersea tunnel, its operation poses specific safety risks, in particular the dangers involved if there is a fire or if passengers are trapped in the tunnel for long periods due to train breakdown. It is therefore right that close attention continues to be paid to the safety regulation of the Fixed Link.

40. Priority issues of concern into the future include:

• the clear publication and notification of all safety and technical rules for the tunnel so that their alignment with the safety and interoperability directives in force can be

demonstrated;

• the consideration of applications to authorise new passenger and freight rolling stock to run through the tunnel and the timely evaluation of applications for the certification of railway undertakings proposing to run new services through the tunnel;

• consideration of new approaches to in-Tunnel evacuation strategy, supported by best-in-class scientific evidence and technical expertise;

• continued application to the Channel Tunnel of new and existing European law, including requirements relating to safety, interoperability and cross-acceptance arising from the work of the European Railway Agency or the further development of the European system of Technical Specifications for Interoperability, in particular the SRT and LOC&PAS TSIs;

• development and delivery of a risk-based supervision strategy for infrastructure and rolling stock operations in line with the CSM for supervision; and

• preparation to deal with serious safety and security incidents, including through the annual rehearsal of the binational emergency plan, which provides the framework for the co-operation of the emergency response organisations of both countries in the event of an accident or incident in the tunnel.

### J - Sources of Information

- 41. The following sources were used when drafting this report:
- Eurotunnel Annual Report on Health and Safety for 2012
- Europorte Channel's Annual Safety Report for 2012
- Eurostar Annual Safety Report for 2012
- EWSI Annual Safety Report for 2012
- DB Schenker Annual Safety Report for 2012

### <u>K - Annexes</u>

- Annex A: Railway Structure Information
- Annex B: IGC Structure and Relationships
- Annex C: Data on Common Safety Indicators (separate Excel spreadsheet)
- Annex D: Important changes in legislation and regulation
- Annex E: The development of safety certification and authorisation Numerical Data

### **ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information**

### A.1. Network map

### Network Map Showing Layout of UK Terminal and Running Tunnels



# A.2 Information about Eurotunnel - The Infrastructure Manager for the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link

Name: Eurotunnel

Address: UK Terminal, Ashford Road, Folkestone, Kent CT18 8XX

Website: <u>www.eurotunnel.com</u>

**Network Statement Link:** 

http://www.eurotunnelfreight.com/uploadedFiles/freight/2012-Network-Statement.pdf

Start Date of Commercial Activity: May 1994

Total Track Length: 159 km main tracks plus 50 km secondary tracks

Track Gauge: UIC

Electrified Track Length: All track both main and secondary is electrified

Voltages: 25,000 volts alternating current

Total Double/Single Length Track: 100% double track

Total Track Length – High Speed Line: 108 km

Automatic Train Protection Equipment Used: TVM 430

Number of Level Crossings: None on main tracks

Number of Signals: 655

### A.3 Information about the Railway Undertakings

The railway undertakings which operated trains through the Fixed Link in 2012 were as follow:

Name:	DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd
Address:	Lakeside Business Park
	Carolina Way
	Doncaster
	South Yorkshire
	DN4 5PN
	UK
Website:	www.rail.dbschenker.co.uk
Name:	Eurostar International Ltd
Address:	Times House
	Bravingtons Walk
	Regent Quarter
	London
	N1 9AW
	UK
Website:	www.eurostar.com
Name:	Europorte Channel
Address:	Tour de Lille
	60 Bd de Turin
	Euralille
	59777 Lille
	France
Website:	www.europorte.com

#### ANNEX B: IGC STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS



Each Government appoints half the members of the IGC which comprises 14 members including at least two representatives of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA).

The composition of the CTSA is determined by the two Governments by agreement and each Government appoints half of its members. In 2012, the CTSA had ten members in total, and its work was supported by 28 advisers, inspectors and auditors.

#### ANNEX C: DATA ON COMMON SAFETY INDICATORS

Data on Common Safety Indicators for 2012 is shown in a separate "Excel" file.

### ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

	Legal reference	Date legislation	Reason for introduction	Description
		comes into force	(Additionally specify new law or amendment to existing legislation)	
General national railway safety				N/A
legislation				
Legislation concerning the national	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
safety authority				
Legislation concerning notified bodies,	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
assessors, third parties bodies for				
registration, examination, etc.				
National rules concerning railway safet	у			
Rules concerning national safety targets	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
and methods				
Rules concerning requirements on	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
safety management systems and safety				
certification of Railway Undertakings				
Rules concerning requirements on	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
safety management systems and Safety				
Authorisation of Infrastructure Managers				
Rules concerning requirements for	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
wagon keepers				
Rules concerning requirements for	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
maintenance workshops				
Rules concerning requirements for the	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
authorisation of placing in service and				
maintenance of new and substantially				
altered rolling stock, including rules for				
exchange of rolling stock between				
Railway Undertakings, registration				
systems and requirements on testing				
procedures	NONE	N1/A	N1/A	N1/A
Common operating rules of the railway	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
network, including fules relating to the				
Signaling and traffic procedures		N1/A	N1/A	NI/A
additional internal operating rules	NONE	IN/A	IN/A	
(company rules) that must be				
established by the Infrastructure				
Managers and Pailway Undertakings				
Managers and Railway Undertakings				

Rules concerning requirements on staff executing safety critical tasks, including selection criteria, medical fitness and vocational training and certification	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning the investigation of the and incidents including recommendation	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for national safety indicators including how to collect and analyse the indicators	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for authorisation of placing in service the infrastructure (tracks, bridges, tunnels, energy, ATC, radio, signalling, interlocking, level crossing, platforms, etc.)	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A

### E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

A. To ensure the information on ERADIS is current in place, please supply numbers of existing certificates in ERADIS which were valid at the end of the reporting vear			
<ul> <li>B. Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section "G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers "</li> </ul>	Total number of certificates	Number of certificates Part A in ERADIS	
E.1.1. Number of safety certificates Part A issued in the reporting and in previous years and remain valid at the end of year 2012	0		

C. To ensure the informatio				
in ERADIS which were va				
reporting year				
D. Please ensure that the in	formation provided in this		Number of	
table is in line with the in	formation provided in	Total	certificates	
section "G. Supervision c	number of	Part B in		
Infrastructure Managers	0	certificates	ERADIS	
	Number of certificates Part			
E.1.2. Number of safety	B, for which the Part A has			
certificates Part B issued	been issued in your			
in the reporting and in	Member-State			
previous years by your				
member state and remain	1			
valid in the year 2012	been issued in another	4		
	Member-State			

Please provide input on applications for certificates Part A received in the current reporting year for new certificates or existing certificates which need to be renewed or updated/amended			R	Р
E.1.3. Number of new	New certificates	0	0	0
applications for Safety Certificates <b>Part A</b> submitted by Railway	Updated/amended certificates	0	0	0
Undertakings in year 2012	Renewed certificates	0	0	0

Please provide input on applications for certificates Part B received in the					
current reporting year for new certificates or existing certificates which need					
to be renewed or updated/amended				R	Р
E.1.4. Number of new Where the Part New certificates				0	0
applications for Safety A has been Updated/amended certificates					0

Certificates <b>Part B</b> submitted by Railway	issued in your Member-State renewed certificates				
Undertakings in year 2012	Where the PartNew certificates0		0	0	0
	A has been	A has been Updated/amended certificates 0		0	1
	issued in another Member-State	Renewed certificates	3	0	0

A = Accepted application, certificate is already issued

R = Rejected applications, no certificate was issued

P = Case is still pending, no certificate was issued so far

To ensure the information on ERADIS is current in place, please supply numbers of certificates in ERADIS revoked at the end of the reporting year	Total number of revoked certificates in the year 2012	Number of revoked certificates in ERADIS (which were revoked in 2012)
E 1.5 Number of certificates Part A revoked in the current reporting year	0	0
E 1.6 Number of certificates Part B revoked in the current reporting year	0	0

E.1.7. List of countries where RUs applying for a Safety Certificate Part B in your Member-State have obtained their Safety Certificate Part A

Name of RU	Member-State where Safety Certificate Part A was			
	issued			
English Welsh & Scottish Railway International Ltd	UK			
DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd	UK			
Eurostar International Ltd	UK			
Europorte Channel	FR			

### E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

Please ensure that the information provided in this		
table is in line with the information provided in section	Total number	
"G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and	of safety	
Infrastructure Managers "	authorisations	
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to		
Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in	1	
previous years and remain valid at the end of the year	Ŧ	
2012		

Guidance:				
Please provide input on applications for Safety Authorisations received in the				
current reporting year for new authorisations or existing authorisations which				
need to be renewed or updated/amended			R	Р
E.2.2. Number of employations for Cofety	New authorisations	0	0	0
E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety	Updated/amended	0	0	0
Authorisations submitted by intrastructure	authorisations	0	0	0
Managers III year 2012	Renewed authorisations	0	0	0

A = Accepted application, authorisation is already issued

R = Rejected applications, no authorisation was issued

P = Case is still pending, no authorisation was issued so far

E 2.3 Number of Safety Authorisations revoked in the current	0
reporting year	

### E.3. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part A

	New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving of the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate <b>Part A</b> in year 2012 for Railway Undertakings	n/a	n/a	n/a

### E.4. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part B

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving the application with the required	Where the part A has been issued in your Member-State	n/a	n/a	n/a
of a Safety Certificate <b>Part B</b> in year 2012 for RUs	Where the part A has been issued in another Member-State	116 days	n/a	n/a

### E.5. Procedural aspects – Safety Authorisations

	New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving	n/a	n/a	n/a

the application with the required		
information and the final delivery		
of a Safety Authorisation in year		
2012 for IMs		