

**REPORT BY THE CHANNEL TUNNEL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON
SAFETY IN THE CHANNEL TUNNEL FIXED
LINK DURING 2019**

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A - Scope of the report

1. This report contains information relating to the activities of the Channel Tunnel Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) in its role as the safety authority for the Channel Fixed Link (the Channel Tunnel) within the terms of the European Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC). The IGC's responsibilities extend only to the area of the Fixed Link as described in the Treaty of Canterbury¹ between the United Kingdom and France and the Concession Agreement² between the two Governments and the Concessionaires in 1986. This report covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2019.

2. A French version of the report has also been prepared and submitted to the European Union Agency for Railways (the Agency) together with this English document, as it is the IGC's policy to make all of its documents that are in the public domain available in both English and French.

¹ Available on the IGC website at http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/spip.php?action=accéder_document&arg=93&cle=939ac28402cdf20e06d641b2ef2d1ece&file=pdf%2FTreaty_of_Canterbury_1986.pdf

² Available on the IGC website at http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/spip.php?action=accéder_document&arg=94&cle=eb523418f351e57679238f0cf5452e8d&file=pdf%2FConcession_Agreement.pdf

B. Preliminary section

3. **Introduction-** The directive on safety on the Community's railways (2016/798/EU) contains a clause concerning a binational body entrusted by the Member States to ensure a unified safety regime for specialised cross-border infrastructures, said body performing the functions of a 'safety authority' (NSA). This clause has been implemented for the Fixed Link, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreeing that the IGC would be the 'safety authority'. This report is prepared in accordance with Article 19 of the Directive and complies as far as possible with the model established and guidance issued by the Agency, which aims to provide a structure and table of common elements for this type of report. As required by the Directive, the report is submitted to the Agency.

4. **Information on railway infrastructure** – The Channel Tunnel railway infrastructure includes a rail link consisting of two drilled twin rail tunnels connecting Cheriton in Kent, England and Fréthun in the Pas-de-Calais, France, as well as the terminals located on each side. The terminals include: high-speed lines linking the tunnel to the UK and French national railway networks; rail loops and platforms for loading and unloading passenger and freight shuttles; depots, maintenance facilities and tracks linking these facilities to the rest of the infrastructure.

5. **Infrastructure manager** - A network map and information about Eurotunnel, the infrastructure manager of the Fixed Link, are given in **Annex A**.

6. **Railway undertakings** – The rail transport undertakings which have operated trains in the Channel Tunnel during the period covered by this report are: DB Cargo (UK) Ltd, Eurostar International Ltd and GB Railfreight Limited. The addresses and websites of these railway undertakings are provided in **Annex A.3**. The annual reports of the French and UK safety authorities provide further information about them.

7. **Summary** - In 2019, the major events were as follows:

- continuation of the dedicated working group's work to review and monitor measures taken by Eurotunnel and ElecLink to manage the safe installation of a high-voltage electricity cable in the Tunnel, as required under the prior consent given by the IGC for this project on 7 February 2014. The consent was suspended by the IGC on 18 October 2017 and has not yet been reinstated, and Eurotunnel received a Direction in July 2018 prohibiting the installation of the cable until the restoration of the IGC consent.

In February 2019, Eurotunnel submitted a safety dossier in support of this project. Following a review by the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA) and its experts, Eurotunnel was informed that further evidence was needed to deliver an appropriate safety assessment, meeting the requirements of Directive 402/2013 concerning the assessment and evaluation of the risks related to this change; a new dossier was submitted by the company on 21 November 2019 which is currently being reviewed by the CTSA. At the end of 2019, the IGC worked closely with Eurotunnel and external experts to resolve a number of outstanding safety issues in order to reinstate the consent;

- ongoing monitoring by the CTSA of measures taken mainly by Eurotunnel to comply with recommendations made in three reports in respect of the fire on an Arbel freight shuttle on 17 January 2015: (1) the National Investigation Body

(NIB) report published by the Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre (BEA-TT) and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) on 5 May 2016; (2) the report commissioned by the IGC from Claude Gressier and Chris Gibb into the management of disruptions in the Channel Tunnel; and (3) the review of firefighting incidents commissioned by the IGC and carried out by the CTSA fire and rescue experts;

- ongoing monitoring of Eurotunnel's response to the recommendation regarding 'Management of the risks associated with over-height objects' from the 2016 National Investigation Body (NIB) report into the 17 January 2015 Channel Tunnel fire. This recommendation suggested the reinstallation of pagodas previously removed from wagons or consideration of alternative mitigation measures to reduce risk of over height objects coming into contact with tunnel infrastructure. In 2018 Eurotunnel advised the IGC that it was intending to fit all shuttle carrier wagons with four pagodas. In response the IGC granted a letter of non-objection on 20 February 2019 for Eurotunnel to operate its Arbel and WBN fleet with four pagodas. This work is due to be completed mid-2021. In the interim period, the IGC has required that Eurotunnel must retain the additional risk mitigation measures it has implemented until evidence has been supplied that the risks currently managed by these measures will continue to be mitigated to an acceptable level through the fitting of four pagodas per wagon. The IGC continues to closely monitor the implementation of these measures;
- completion of the Eurotunnel safety management system (SMS) assessment and granting of a renewal of its safety authorisation on 28 March 2019 for a period of a further five years;
- on 20 February 2019 IGC issued a first authorisation for the placing into service and operation of GSM-R Cab Mobile systems on Eurotunnel Brush and Krupp locomotives;
- in December 2019 the IGC asked its Joint Economic Committee (JEC) to work with Eurotunnel to carry out a study with the aim of improving its understanding of the Infrastructure Manager's practice for managing the assets of the Fixed Link; and
- on 2 May 2019 the issue of two enforcement notices on Eurotunnel in relation to its lack of a workplace transport risk assessment – in contravention of the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 – and its inadequate approach to the organisation of traffic routes – in contravention of the Workplace Health Safety and Welfare Regulations 1999. These notices were issued by the UK Office of Rail and Road (ORR), in full agreement with the CTSA. These notices were subsequently complied with by Eurotunnel to the satisfaction of ORR in April 2020.

8. **Analysis of global trends** - as well as completing the Eurotunnel SMS assessment to obtain the Infrastructure Manager's new safety authorisation, the IGC and CTSA continued monitoring these safety management arrangements and monitoring the safety outcomes. Most of the common safety indicators reported in detail in **Annex C** remain at zero.

The value of Eurotunnel's internal Passenger Individual Safety indicator (which analyses events likely to affect a small number of people and monitors issues such as emergency braking due to slippage or automatic activation and stopping in the tunnel for more than 30 minutes), was 234 in December 2019, which is below the Eurotunnel target of 270. The comparable figure for 2018 was 262. The Passenger Collective Safety indicator

(which analyses events likely to affect the safety of a large number of people through the involvement of a train in an incident endangering the train itself and covers issues such as near misses, SPADs (Signals Passed at Danger), loss of control of points, detection of locked brakes, emergency braking, stopping in tunnels, failure to comply with signals, fuel spills, crossover door incidents and Major failure of track equipment) was 74 in December 2019 (compared to the 2018 figure of 80). This was slightly below the target figure of 75. CTSA continues to encourage Eurotunnel to continuously improve its approach to monitoring the performance of its safety management system, by collaborating and benchmarking with other rail industry organisations and operators.

C - Organisation

9. The IGC was created by the Treaty of Canterbury, signed on 12 February 1986, to supervise, on behalf of the governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic and by delegation thereof, all issues concerning the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. Since 2007, Directive 2004/49, transposed by the binational safety regulation, has given the IGC the status of National Safety Authority. Among its duties, the IGC is responsible for drawing up any regulations applicable to the Fixed Link or contributing to this process.

10. The Treaty of Canterbury also established the CTSA to advise and assist the IGC on all matters relating to safety during the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. The functions of the CTSA are also to ensure that safety regulations and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with national, binational or international regulations, to enforce such regulations and to monitor their implementation, to examine reports into any incidents affecting safety, to carry out investigations and to report to the IGC.

11. The UK and French Secretariats are responsible for preparing and implementing the decisions taken by the IGC and the CTSA.

12. A diagram showing the structure of the IGC and its links with other organisations is given in **Annex B**.

D. Changes in railway safety

D 1 - Initiatives to maintain or improve safety results

Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents / precursors of accidents

Accidents / precursors of accidents which triggered the measure			Determined safety measure
Date	Place	Event description	
N/A			

Table D.1.2 - Safety measures (or voluntary measures) triggered by factors other than accidents / precursors of accidents

Description of the area of concern	Description of the trigger	Determined safety measure
N/A		

D 2 - Detailed analysis of trends

13. Very few defined precursors (incidents that could have led to an accident as defined in the Safety Directive) occurred in the Channel Tunnel. The IGC and the CTSA did not conduct a "detailed analysis of trends" compared to the CSIs (Common Safety Indicators) because in view of the small number this would not be a useful or proportionate method likely to provide significant information on safety performance. In 2019, there were 19 broken rails, two SPADs and one wrong-side signalling failure. Below, a summary of the CSI precursors that did occur allows a comparison with the incidents of the previous year:

	2018	2019
Total number of precursors	16	22
Total number of broken rails	11	19
Total number of track buckles	0	0
Total number of signalling failures	0	1
Total SPAD	5	2
Total number of broken wheels on rolling stock in service	0	0
Total number of broken axles on rolling stock in service	0	0

Due to the increasing numbers of broken rail incidents, the CTSA carried out a specific Track Maintenance and Defect Management inspection of Eurotunnel during 2019.

14. **Common Safety Indicators (CSI)** - Details on CSIs as defined in Directive 2009/149/EC (amending Directive 2004/49/EC with regard to CSIs and common methods to calculate the cost of accidents) are given in **Annex C**. It should be noted that the IGC and the CTSA receive a significant amount of richer and more useful information from Eurotunnel and the railway undertakings which helps them develop their approach to regulatory and supervisory activity. However, this information falls outside the scope of CSI reports.

D 3 - Results of safety recommendations

15. On 5 May 2016 BEA-TT and RAIB published their joint NIB report into the fire on Eurotunnel (Arbel) freight shuttle 7340 which occurred on 17 January 2015.³ This report contained six recommendations (all addressed to Eurotunnel) and six invitations (five for Eurotunnel and one for the IGC). In accordance with its legal obligations⁴ the IGC, as NSA for the Channel Tunnel, provided its response to this report on 11 May 2017 outlining the measures taken or planned as a consequence of the recommendations made. It has also submitted to the investigation bodies further updates on progress on 8 June 2018, 6 September 2019, and 23 December 2019. To date, two recommendations and four invitations have been reported as closed.

16. The IGC has committed to monitor actions to respond to the outstanding recommendations and invitations and to report at least annually to BEA-TT and RAIB on progress. These monitoring activities have led to Eurotunnel's agreement to reinstate four pagodas to each Arbel and WBN wagon and to retain agreed alternative mitigation measures (e.g. in particular, catenary cut-out on platforms) whilst this work is being completed.

E - Important legislative, regulatory and administrative changes

17. **Regulation on the safety of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link** - No new regulations were published for the Channel Tunnel in 2019.

18. **Other major regulatory matters processed by the IGC and CTSA** - Other important issues processed by the IGC and the CTSA during the year are as follows:

- **Cross-acceptance of rules for railway vehicles passing through the Tunnel** – On 9 January 2018, as a result of the CTSA working with EPSF and Eurotunnel to compare the requirements of the relevant national and Channel Tunnel network statements to assess whether the rules are equivalent and therefore do not need to be re-checked as part of the vehicle re-authorisation process, a revised version of the '*Channel Tunnel Reference Document for cross-acceptance of rail vehicles*' was approved and published by the IGC.

On 12 September 2019 the Agency issued its opinion of a negative assessment of four of the revised Channel Tunnel rules. As a result of further discussions

³ Available on the RAIB website at

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521184/160505_ReportET2016_eurotunnel_eng.pdf.

⁴ Pursuant to Article 752 of the Regulation of the Intergovernmental Commission on the use of the Channel Tunnel dated 24 January 2007, as amended by the IGC Regulation signed on 6 February 2013, published in France by Decree No. 2013-318 of 15 April 2013 and the United Kingdom by the Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 407: The Channel Tunnel (Safety) (Amendment) Order 2013).

between individuals from the CTSA, EPSF and Eurotunnel, three of these rules were revised in a response to the Agency on 9 December 2019 and an updated cross-acceptance document was published by the IGC on 10 January 2020.

- **Discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers -** During the year, the IGC and the CTSA continued to hold discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers about the requirements they must meet to obtain technical authorisation to operate in the Tunnel. This included discussions with a number of parties interested in producing and running trains and freight wagons for use through the tunnel including ELH Waggonbau Niesky GmbH and Tatravagonka / Ricardo Rail.
- **Participation in the work of the Agency and its working groups –** During 2019 the IGC and CTSA continued to play a full part in the work of the Agency and its various working groups. Given their close relationship with the safety authorities of France and Great Britain, the IGC and CTSA relied on their close links with the safety authorities' experts (many of them are themselves members of or advisors to the CTSA). The IGC and CTSA only participated directly in working groups that were particularly relevant to the Channel Tunnel, for example, the introduction of the One Stop Shop and the TSI for Safety in Railway Tunnels, but its representatives attended all meetings of the Agency's network of national safety authorities and working groups dealing with national rules and cross-acceptance. In early 2020, due to the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, representatives from the UK were excluded from such activities and the CTSA ceased to participate.

F - Changes in safety certificates and authorisations

19. The directive on Community Railway Safety was transposed in respect of the Tunnel by the Binational Safety Regulation of 24 January 2007 which entered into force on 4 July 2008 via Statutory Instrument 2007-3531 in the UK and Decree 2008-748 in France. The revised Railway Safety Directive (2008/110/EC) and the new Interoperability Directive (2008/57/EC) were transposed for the Fixed Link in March 2013 via a modified binational regulation supplementing the regulation for national interoperability. The revised guide to the implementation of the regulations is available on the IGC website via the following URL:

<http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/-Regulations-and-guidance-.html?lang=en>

20. Work to implement the recast Safety Directive 2016/798/EU into a revised binational regulation for the Fixed Link is ongoing.

21. During 2019 the IGC authorised the renewal of Eurotunnel's safety authorisation for a further five year period from 28 March 2019.

G - Supervision of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers

22. The 1986 Treaty of Canterbury assigned to the CTSA the responsibility to ensure that safety regulations and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with national, binational and international laws, to enforce those laws, to monitor implementation and to report to the Intergovernmental Commission. The Treaty also stipulates that, in order

to ensure its remit, the CTSA may request the assistance of the administrations of each of the governments, as well as the assistance of any body or expert of its choice, and that both governments must give the CTSA and its members and agents the powers of investigation, inspection and prescription necessary to exercise its functions. The quadripartite Concession Agreement stipulates that the concessionaires must give access to any part of the Fixed Link to persons duly authorised by the IGC or with the approval thereof by the CTSA, so that these people, as part of their duties, may inspect the Fixed Link and investigate any matter relating to the construction or operation thereof. The concessionaires must provide these people with all means necessary to exercise their functions.

23. The broad mandate given to the CTSA by the Treaty of Canterbury means it is responsible for overseeing a number of matters outside the scope of safety authority tasks under the Safety Directive, in particular emergency and civil safety issues. This is reflected in its supervision strategy.

1.1 Audits / Inspections / Controls

24. The CTSA's annual inspection and audit programme is designed to take account of key information included in the safety management systems (SMS) of Eurotunnel and the railway undertakings authorised to use the Channel Tunnel.

25. The following monitoring methods were used in 2019:

- inspections of Eurotunnel and railway undertakings (a list of the subjects covered is given below);
- information flows - regular reports from Eurotunnel such as daily reports by the Operations Duty Manager (ODM); monthly summaries of incidents and safety performance, minutes of the Concession Safety Committee, Operating Performance reports, etc.;
- information obtained from incident and accident investigations;
- audit reports (internal and external);
- regular and ad hoc meetings between Eurotunnel and CTSA experts;
- meetings with the railway undertakings; and
- Eurotunnel information about its interface with the railway undertakings and change management.

1.2 Points of note / sensitive issues to be monitored by the safety authority

26. Inspections during the year have resulted in a number of recommendations which have been officially communicated to Eurotunnel, Eurostar, DB Cargo and GB Railfreight by the CTSA, including on the following issues:

- Eurotunnel to obtain assurance that:
 - The working instruction for the member of terminal staff in charge of loading is revised to include a clear statement of the risks of moving vehicles and where loaders are expected to stand;

- Safety meetings held by Eurotunnel clearly and systematically report on observing the position of loaders; and
- The positioning of loaders is monitored by subcontractors and is clearly recorded in the relevant reports;
- Concerning governance of the ElecLink project; Eurotunnel is to:
 - review the distribution of roles between the Getlink Group and the Concessionaries:
 - improve the provision of information to the final decision maker in the context of the ElecLink project.
- Concerning track maintenance, Eurotunnel is to prepare and implement a document to ensure track monitoring and its implementation;
- Concerning the transport of dangerous goods, Eurotunnel is to check the Eurotunnel Rail Control Centre's (RCC's) knowledge of the requirements and processes for running freight trains through the Tunnel and adapt Eurotunnel's Safety, Quality and Environment (SQE) assessments of the railway undertakings to reflect the "lack of dangerous goods transport";
- Provide the risk analysis that led to the removal of aerial detectors; check the platform ramps after loading. Eurostar is to implement the CTSA's recommendations related to the management of technical modifications applied to rolling stock which are planned or carried out in response to incidents.
- DB Cargo and GB Railfreight are to implement the CTSA's recommendations related to pre-departure checks of freight trains in transit through the Channel Tunnel.

27. All recommendations have been added to a consolidated recommendations follow-up table to enable the CTSA to monitor and review Eurotunnel's progress in implementing appropriate measures to comply with these recommendations.

2. Description of the coverage of legal issues in the annual reports of the railway undertakings and infrastructure manager - availability of annual reports by 30 June [in accordance with Article 9 (6) of the Railway Safety Directive]

28. The infrastructure manager and railway undertakings have reported their activities in accordance with the requirements of Article 9.6 and Annex I of the Railway Safety Directive.

3. Inspections

29. The planned inspection activity was still based on the areas identified by the CTSA experts in their analysis of the Eurotunnel and railway undertakings' SMS. However, the inspection plan provides for flexibility to address concerns revealed by Channel Tunnel activities during the year.

30. In total, five inspection reports produced by the CTSA experts were sent to Eurotunnel in 2019. These covered the following topics:

- Change management. This was a follow-up to two change management inspections undertaken in 2016;
- Follow-up inspection to check the effectiveness of arrangements put in place by Eurotunnel following September 2016 UK Cross-over inspection & Nov 2016 EMS inspection;
- Inspection of change management in the context of the ElecLink project (carried out in 2018);
- Dangerous Goods inspection; and
- Track maintenance and defects management.

4. Audits

31. In 2019, Eurotunnel carried out 6 internal audits, and the three railway undertakings carried out a total of 25 internal audits on topics such as infrastructure and rolling stock maintenance, organisation and critical tasks, operational safety arrangements compliance, freight yard inspections, and independent strategic safety.

5. Summary of measures and relevant corrective actions (amendment, revocation, suspension, important warnings, etc.) related to safety aspects following these audits / inspections

H - Report on the implementation of the common safety method (CSM) for risk evaluation and assessment

32. In its 2019 report, Eurotunnel confirmed that the installation of the ElecLink cable would represent a significant change in accordance with the CSM and carried out a risk assessment in respect of its proposal to reinstate four pagodas to its Arbel and WBN type Wagon fleet. Eurotunnel also identified a number of other projects which had been assessed as likely to bring a significant modification and were therefore subject to the application of the CSM, namely its passenger shuttle mid-life renovation programme and the replacement of its Breda wagon fleet.

33. The three railway undertakings reported that all changes considered and undertaken were found to be non-significant in accordance with the definition in the CSM.

34. The CTSA believes that the CSM for Risk Evaluation and Assessment continues to provide a robust framework for assessing proposed changes, and for developing, implementing and monitoring suitable risk controls. Nevertheless, the necessary knowledge, skills and competency to effectively comply with the Regulation continue to challenge the industry, as well as effective roles and responsibilities for supervising and assuring that compliance.

I – IGC conclusions regarding 2019 - Priorities

35. The Channel Tunnel is extremely important. It is used every year by more than twenty million road and rail passengers between the United Kingdom and France and connects the United Kingdom to the high-speed rail network of the rest of Europe. The use of the 50 km long underwater tunnel does not fully meet the Safety in Railway Tunnels TSI, and poses specific safety problems, especially in the event of fire or

breakdowns immobilising passengers for hours. It is therefore entirely justifiable that particular attention be paid to the safety rules applicable to the Fixed Link.

36. As a result of the UK leaving the European Union a key focus of the IGC currently is to understand the impact of this change on its role as a National Safety Authority, and to implement any structural, organisational and functional changes that arise from it.

J - Sources of Information

37. The following sources were used when drafting this report:

- Eurotunnel Annual Report on Health and Safety for 2019
- GB Railfreight Annual Safety Report for 2019
- Eurostar Annual Safety Report for 2019
- DB Cargo Annual Safety Report for 2019

K - Annexes

Annex A: Information on railway infrastructure and transport undertakings

Annex B: IGC Structure and Relationships

Annex C: Data on Common Safety Indicators (separate Excel spreadsheet)

Annex C1: Safety-related incidents included in previous reports published by the CTSA

Annex D: Important legislative and regulatory changes

Annex E: Granting of safety certificates and authorisations – Numerical Data

ANNEX A: Information on railway infrastructure and transport undertakings

A.1. Network map

Maps showing the layout of the UK and French terminals and a schematic diagram showing the running tunnels – including the two crossovers – are shown overleaf.

A.2 Information about Eurotunnel, Infrastructure Manager for the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link

Name: Eurotunnel

Address: UK Terminal, Ashford Road, Folkestone, Kent CT18 8XX

Website: www.eurotunnel.com

Network Statement link:

<https://www.getlinkgroup.com/content/uploads/2019/09/Eurotunnel-network-statement-2020.pdf>

Start date of commercial activity: May 1994

Total track length: 159 km main tracks plus 50 km secondary tracks

Track gauge: UIC

Electrified track length: All track, both main and secondary, is electrified

Voltage: 25,000 volts alternating current

Total double/single length track: 100% double track

Total track length – High Speed Line: 108 km

Automatic train protection equipment used: TVM 430

Number of level crossings: None on main tracks

Number of signals: 655

A.3 Information about the Railway Undertakings

The railway undertakings which operated trains through the Fixed Link in 2014 were as follows:

Name: DB Cargo Rail (UK) Limited

Address: Lakeside Business Park
Carolina Way
Doncaster
South Yorkshire
DN4 5PN
UK

Website: www.uk.dbcargo.com

Name: Eurostar International Ltd

Address: Times House
Bravingtons Walk
Regent Quarter
London
N1 9AW
UK


Website: <https://www.eurostar.com/uk-en>

Name: GB Railfreight

Address: 3rd Floor
55 Old Broad Street
London
EC2M 1RX

Website: <http://www.gbrailfreight.com>

ANNEX B: IGC STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS



Each Government appoints half the members of the IGC which comprises 14 members including at least two representatives of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA).

The composition of the CTSA is determined by the two Governments by agreement and each Government appoints half of its members. In 2019, the CTSA had ten members in total, and its work was supported by a number of advisers, inspectors and auditors.

ANNEX C: COMMON SAFETY INDICATOR (CSI) DATA

Data on Common Safety Indicators for 2019 is shown in a separate Excel file.

ANNEX D: Important legislative, regulatory and administrative changes

	Legal reference	Date legislation comes into force	Reason for introduction (Also specify whether this is a new law or amendment to existing legislation)	Description
General national railway safety legislation				
Legislation concerning the national safety authority	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Legislation concerning notified bodies, assessors, third party bodies for registration, inspection, etc.	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
National rules concerning railway safety				
Rules concerning national safety targets and methods	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for safety management systems and safety certification for Railway Undertakings	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for safety management systems and safety certification for Infrastructure Managers	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for wagon keepers	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for entities in charge of maintenance	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for maintenance workshops	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
National safety rules applicable to RUs* and safety rules applicable to other parties in the rail sector	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for the authorisation of placing in service and maintenance of new or substantially modified rolling stock, including rules for exchange of rolling stock between Railway Undertakings, registration systems and requirements for testing procedures	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A

Common operating rules for the railway network, including rules relating to signalling and traffic procedures	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules laying down requirements for additional internal operating rules (company rules) that must be established by the Infrastructure Managers and Railway Undertakings	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for staff executing critical safety tasks, including selection criteria, medical fitness, vocational training and certification	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning investigation of accidents and incidents including recommendations	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A

ANNEX E: Changes in safety certificates and authorisations – numerical data

E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

<p>A. To ensure the information on ERADIS is up-to-date, please supply numbers of existing certificates in ERADIS which were valid at the end of the reporting year</p> <p>B. Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section "G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers"</p>	Total number of certificates	Number of Part A certificates in ERADIS	
E.1.1. Number of Part A safety certificates issued in the reporting year and in previous years and still valid at the end of 2019	0	0	

<p>C. To ensure the information on ERADIS is up-to-date, please supply numbers of existing certificates in ERADIS which were valid at the end of the reporting year</p> <p>D. Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section "G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers"</p>	Total number of certificates	Number of Part B certificates in ERADIS		
E.1.2. Number of Part B safety certificates issued in the reporting year and in previous years and still valid at the end of 2019	Number of Part B certificates, for which Part A was issued in your Member State	0	0	
	Number of Part B certificates, for which Part A was issued in another Member State	0	3	

Please provide information on applications for Part A certificates received in the current reporting year for new certificates or existing certificates which need to be renewed or updated/amended		A	R	P
E.1.3. Number of new applications for Part A Safety Certificates submitted by Railway Undertakings in 2019	New certificates	0	0	0
	Updated/amended certificates	0	0	0
	Renewed certificates	0	0	0

Please provide information on applications for Part B certificates received in the current reporting year for new certificates or existing certificates which need to be renewed or updated/amended		A	R	P
E.1.4. Number of new applications for Part B	New certificates	0	0	0
	Updated/amended certificates	0	0	0

Safety Certificates submitted by Railway Undertakings in 2019	if Part A was issued in your Member State	Renewed certificates	0	0	0
	if Part A was issued in another Member State	New certificates	0	0	0
		Updated/amended certificates	0	0	0
		Renewed certificates	0	0	0

A = Accepted application, certificate already issued

R = Rejected applications, no certificate issued

P = Case is still pending, no certificate issued so far

To ensure the information on ERADIS is up-to-date, please supply numbers of certificates in ERADIS revoked at the end of the reporting year	Total number of revoked certificates in 2019	Number of revoked certificates in ERADIS (which were revoked in 2019)
E 1.5 Number of Part A certificates revoked in the current reporting year	0	0
E 1.6 Number of Part B certificates revoked in the current reporting year	0	0

E.1.7. List of countries where RUs applying for a Part B Safety Certificate in your Member State obtained their Part A Safety Certificate

Name of RU	Member State where Part A Safety Certificate was issued
DB Cargo UK	UK
Eurostar International Ltd	UK
GB Railfreight	UK

E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section "G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers"	Total number of safety authorisations		
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in previous years and still valid at the end of the 2019	1		

Guidance: Please provide information on applications for Safety Authorisations received in the current reporting year for new authorisations or existing authorisations which need to be renewed or updated/amended		A	R	P
E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in 2019	New authorisations	0	0	0
	Updated/amended authorisations	0	0	0
	Renewed authorisations	0	0	0

A = Accepted application, authorisation already issued

R = Rejected applications, no authorisation issued

P = Case is still pending, no authorisation issued so far

E 2.3 Number of Safety Authorisations revoked in the current reporting year	0
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E.3. Procedural aspects – Part A Safety Certificates

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time between receiving the application with the required information and a Part A Safety Certificate being issued to Railway Undertakings in 2019		n/a	n/a	n/a

E.4. Procedural aspects – Part B Safety Certificates

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time between receiving the application with the required information and a Part B Safety Certificate being issued to RUs in 2019	if Part A was issued in your Member State	n/a	n/a	n/a
	if Part A was issued in another Member State	n/a	n/a	n/a

E.5. Procedural aspects – Safety Authorisations

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time between receiving the application with the required information and a Safety Authorisation being issued to IMs in 2019		n/a	n/a	n/a